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What’s it All About? 
In early 2008, viewers of UK prime-time television saw corporate advertisements identifying 
Cisco Systems as synonymous with the internet. This compelling campaign by an established 
and dominant company was a response to the emergence of a significant Chinese competitor, 
Huawei—founded in 1988 as a private domestic telecoms equipment manufacturer. Since its 
foundation, Huawei’s entrepreneurial flare had flourished across the globe. It employees 
more than 80,000 people, but China’s new colossus does not sell directly to consumers and 
the sheer size of its influence often goes unnoticed. All of Huawei’s shares are owned by 60 
per cent of its employees and its founder, Ren Zhengfei, a former officer in the People's 
Liberation Army, only retains one per cent of the equity. Yet, Zhengfei and his fellow 
directors do not give interviews and Huawei’s board members are not mentioned in its annual 
report: they are merely part of an ‘executive management team’1 , which is commensurate 
with ‘the Chinese way’ where boasting of personal success risks scorn and opprobrium. Over 
the last two decades, Chinese business has gone global by exploiting processes that hardly 
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appear in the Western management and business texts. Chinese connections straddle the 
globe as China’s global organisations learn to play in different markets and, along the way, 
develop the power of change the ‘rules of the game’. Suddenly, a new form of organisational 
‘beast’ has emerged that is capable of astute learning and unconventional tactics. For a while, 
such beasts might go unnoticed. But suddenly they seem able to breathe a form of fire that 
burns the competition. And there is not need to cross the globe to find these Chinese 
‘dragons’, because they will come to you. 
 
 In Dragons at Your Door Ming Zeng and Peter Williamson argue that the new Big 
Beasts of global business—the Chinese Dragons—evolved from their capacity to exploit 
‘cost innovation’. And their clear sense of what they mean by this term is explained with 
elegant effectiveness in an account that covers the components, strengths and vulnerabilities 
of cost-innovation disruptive strategies. Their account of China’s Dragons describes the 
dynamics of growth in market share and global reach of a number of significant Chinese 
companies, such as Huawei, which have achieved prominence across a range of different 
industries. It argues that China is not simply a low-cost competitor since its emerging 
business models are truly disruptive. Superficially, the book might seem to fit the "dire 
warnings" genre. However, the authors are not proposing a zero-sum engagement between 
China and the developed economies; instead, they suggest that there are responses to the 
challenging “cost-innovation” developed by Chinese enterprises which can enhance the 
innovative capacity of established firms. But, is it possible that the Chinese Dragons share 
significant ‘DNA’ with forms of business life that have evolved in other places? 
 
 The description of cost innovation presented in Dragons at Your Door reflects many 
of the elements of ‘open innovation’2. Chesbrough argues that companies can innovate across 
their own boundaries by buying or licensing relevant technologies and derive value from their 
own unused intellectual property and intellectual capital through outward licensing 
agreements or joint ventures and spin-off enterprises. Zeng and Williamson describe how 
Chinese companies have made use of the availability of alternative intellectual property to 
create competition for established high technology products. At the same time, cost 
innovation has allowed these firms to address the large domestic market sectors untouched by 
expensive foreign offerings. This aspect of cost innovation reflects Prahalad’s arguments that 
major companies routinely ignore the potential of the vast ‘bottom of the pyramid’ population 
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of billions who may have limited resources individually but who represent collectively a vast 
untapped market of considerable aggregate value3. 
 
 While Zeng and Williamson’s concept of a Dragon is not mere modification of ‘made 
in West’ ideas (they developed their insights from first-hand familiarity with ‘what Dragons 
do’), critical connections might be made between case studies of Chinese Dragons and the 
West’s way of conceptualising Asia’s rapidly developing economies. Even if such efforts 
established the lack of connections and the need for radically different conceptual models, 
there would be a potential to learn about deficiencies and develop tractable approaches to 
research. We might then be able to conceptualise the differences that ‘make a difference’; for 
example, in comparisons between China and India4. The promise invoices breathtaking 
possibilities. But, to get to there from here, we have to makes sense of ‘the world as we see it’ 
and the concept of a Dragon could be an invaluable aid to traction in notoriously slippery 
territory. 
  
 
Fresh Thinking and the Birth of Dragons   
Peter Williamson has been engaged directly with China for over 25 years and has followed 
the scope and impact of successive changes over that period both for China and the world 
economy. He has been a consultant to corporations, governments and international agencies 
working across the Asia Pacific region and is a consultant and academic in Europe and North 
America. Chinese-born Ming Zeng holds a chair in strategy at the Cheung Kong Graduate 
School of Business, Beijing. Both have been faculty members at INSEAD, Zeng returned to 
China in 2002 and Williamson is currently a Visiting Professor at the Judge Institute, 
Cambridge. Zeng and Williamson’s dramatically different but complementary experiences 
energise the book with an easy—even breezy—flow of prose that penetrates China’s often 
baffling façade: the anatomy of Dragons and their vital functions is laid bare. The book 
comprises an introduction and conclusion, which sandwich five numbered chapters: three of 
which explain what cost innovation can do for the Dragons, while the other two suggest what 
we might do about cost innovation and its fire-breathing exponents. 
 
 So, what is cost innovation? First, Chinese companies offer high technology at low 
cost. Second, they present a large choice in what were considered mass-market environments. 
Third, they use their low cost base to offer specialty products at low prices. These principles 
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are exemplified with a description of the impact of the China International Marine Containers 
Group (CIMC) on the global shipping container business. CIMC’s first container rolled off 
the line in 1982, ‘but a combination of inexperienced management and a downturn in the 
market led the company near disaster’ (p. 4). By 1996, one every five new container made in 
the world was made by CIMC (p. 7). Progress, Zeng and Williamson argue, is all about how 
Chinese players find ‘loose bricks’ in their competitors defences: if you worry away at the 
right loose bricks, the target’s competitive wall can become less stable and ultimately 
crumble. According to Zeng and Williamson, attacking loose bricks is fundamental to the 
processes by which Dragons move from the periphery to the core of global economic 
expansion. 
 
 The growth of cost-driven outsourcing allowed smaller companies to contribute to 
large-scale production. In the past, vertically integrated firms were difficult for new entrants 
to mimic in terms of capacity and capability. However, the distributed nature of 
contemporary outsourced business models means that experience of global conditions can be 
gained within the global production network, without the need for direct competition with 
established transnational companies. A ‘modularisation of manufacturing’ allows 
participation in global production and opens a development pathway of the type that has been 
exploited by Taiwan’s electronics sector. Here the domination of key components – in 
particular mother-boards and hard drives led to the development of integrated products 
typified by the emergence of Acer as a global computer brand5.  
 
 Participating in the global system, even at a junior level, reduces or at least shortens 
the period of protectionism and promotion of national champions—as seen in other Asian 
economies. In contrast to Japan, which nurtured infant industries with naked protectionism, 
China has been open to large-scale inward investment at an early stage in transformation to 
technological and economic superpower. The comparative openness of China, coupled with 
the lure of an immense potential domestic market meant that inward investment rapidly 
became available to supersede the initial support of family-based capital-controlling-
networks from Chinatowns around the globe. Zeng and Williamson illustrate this 
development pathway with the example of Wanxiang, a company that has moved from the 
role of provider of automotive suspension components and bearings to a major global player. 
The blistering pace of what is possible is illustrated with regard to Wanxiang’s path from 
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start-up to dominant national provider of components to foreign first-tier subcontractors 
onward to direct competition with international leaders (pp. 44-45).  
 
Cost Innovation as Market Disruption 
Actions that undermine taken for granted assumptions about a market can loosen crucial 
bricks. Zeng and Ming’s case studies show how some Chinese companies were able to 
circumvent foreign propriety technology with alternative intellectual property. For example, 
the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) was able to make use of 
Russian line-scanning technology to set up a spin-off, Zongxing, to market an alternative to 
the highly protected flat panel technology adopted by Philips and GEC for digital x-ray 
equipment.  
 
 At the same time, necessity remains the mother of much that is deemed innovative. 
Technova, a company developing medical diagnostic equipment were forced to seek an 
alternative to application specific chips (ASICs) which made low volume digital ultrasound 
devices prohibitively expensive. Since they could not replicate this element of the design they 
substituted semi-programmable chips developed for internet devices, a much higher volume 
market. They also leveraged this core cost innovation by substituting generic peripheral 
equipment - data storage and printers - for the expensive dedicated items bundled with the 
products offered by the established manufacturers.  
 
 Both Technova and Zongxing demonstrate the relevance of key aspects of open 
innovation to the Chinese practice of cost innovation. However, having entered a market with 
a new product cost innovators are willing to sacrifice the large margins and premium created 
by restricting the latest technology to only the high-end models and products in return for 
market penetration. Zeng and Williamson argue that the pay-off is significant, disrupting the 
western model that extracts maximum value from a new technology through high prices, only 
diffusing it to lower cost products as it becomes relatively mature.  
 
 In medical diagnostics, cost innovation has created a greater range of Chinese 
alternative products priced much more cheaply than those of established foreign competitors. 
As a consequence a vastly expanded market was developed among second tier hospitals and 
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clinics which were formerly unable to consider this class of equipment due to high costs. The 
delivery of state-of-the-art-technology to the health system rather than only to leading 
research and teaching hospitals echoes the bottom of the pyramid sensibility. Subsequently 
Zongxing’s competitors in the digital x-ray market either withdrew or halved their own 
prices. Zeng and Williamson identify this ability to create mass markets for formerly elite 
products as one of the keys to the rapid growth of Chinese firms. However, the approach can 
be equally successful in relatively mature sectors. 
 
 Haier, a 23-year-old appliance maker entered the US market in 1994, with three mini-
refrigerator models created for Chinese domestic conditions which filled an unrecognised 
niche in the US market but by 1999 was making full-size models in South Carolina. Haier 
also built market share in an established high value niche product - the refrigerated wine 
chiller. In this case a radically lower pricing structure supporting volume production was used 
to attack a niche market. Such cost-innovation undermines the strategy of developing niche 
markets since any retreat to niche volumes by an established company reduces the resources 
available to them for re-investment and development.  
 
 Attempts to repel Dragons by developing a niche can be akin to defending a few 
remaining bricks after the wall has crumbled. But the experience of destroying the bigger 
structure can buoy a Dragon’s sense of growing momentum. And, without a wall to give it 
identity, an individual brick is not much of defence. In the case of CIMC, mentioned earlier, 
revenue generated through economies of scale generated high-volume in existing markets, 
while the relentless targeting of loose bricks—through the ingenious coupling of cost-
effective novelty to the evolving needs of customers—opens access to new markets. 
Moving from specific Dragons to conceptual models, the CIMC example emphasises the 
questions raised by Kaplinsky and Morris6 over the viability of export-led manufacturing as a 
route to development for less developed economies, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
growing dominance of China and India in many areas of manufacturing appears to relegate 
the region to the role of provider of the commodities required by these dominant economies. 
Even Brazil and Australia, both commodity driven economies with advanced technology 
sectors, might meet difficulties in maintaining a meaningful manufacturing base in the longer 
term. But how do Dragon’s loosen bricks? 
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Loosening Bricks 
Many loose bricks lie at the bottom of big structures, where the smallest margins which are 
most vulnerable to cost-innovation. Winning by a minimal margin can be sufficient to render 
the rival uncompetitive and thereby reach a tipping-point with absolute consequences. If the 
competitor is driven out of business, a brick is removed to reveal a market opportunity. This 
tactic indicates an appreciation of the value delivered by the sheer volume at the “bottom of 
the pyramid”7. Cost innovation is added to cost competition to maximise the return on these 
volume sales. This approach has been applied by others to peripheral markets where there is 
less competition for the limited value available. For example, Korean consumer electronics 
companies established local production for eastern European markets soon after the fall of the 
Berlin wall. Access to these markets both contributed to overall volume and allowed a 
relatively safe learning space for companies new to western markets.  
 
 Additionally some Chinese companies have identified troublesome customers as a 
learning resource. The specific needs of SE Asian neighbours have provided this opportunity. 
Comfortable incumbent market leaders may well dismiss local requirements as simply too 
troublesome in relation to market size to bother with. Zeng and Williamson provide the 
example of the mobile phone company of former Thai Prime Minister Taksin Shinawatra. 
Huawei was prepared to meet esoteric requirements and high pressure deadlines and were 
rewarded with a repertoire of eighty unique features in mobile telephony which could then be 
used to develop customised solutions for further customers.  
 
 In summary, cost innovation begins with the pursuit of higher volume sales at lower 
margins for an innovative technology. This generates a cash stream that allows further 
research and rapid development of the product range and the targeting of higher value niches. 
The examples presented in Dragons at Your Door demonstrate a powerful combination of 
elements of open innovation8 with the use of the “bottom of the pyramid philosophy”9 in the 
creation of high-volume demand for previously low-volume technologies and products. But is 
cost-innovation everything? 
 
 
Responding to Cost Innovation 
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The fourth of Zeng and Williamson’s five numbered chapters is entitled ‘Weak Links’. Cost 
innovation has its limitations, together with implications for the development of Chinese 
manufacturing and product innovation. They also indicate what responses are available to 
established players faced with the challenge of cost innovation. 
 
  As Zeng and Williamson are quick to concede, the success of the model they have 
described is dependent in part on the modular nature of much of current manufacturing. 
However, there are both products and, equally importantly, services which require a more 
integrated and systemic approach. These are less amenable to infiltration by relatively 
inexperienced start-up companies. Emergent industries where there is no dominant 
technology and no established pattern to which to respond also present a significant barrier to 
the application of cost innovation. 
  
 Using a graph that plots ‘impediments to cost innovation’ against ‘global gateways’ 
(p. 132), Zeng and Williamson contrast products such as toys, clothing, personal computers, 
home appliances, and consumer electronics—where the Chinese Dragons enjoy compelling 
advantages—with petrochemicals, medicine and aircraft, where the complexity of challenge 
cannot be reduced to discrete ‘bricks’ and the ‘gateway’ to global markets is blocked by 
difficult-to-master ‘intangible assets’ that have been accumulated by the established players. 
These constitute complex systems in which ‘knowing how to carve opportunities from 
shifting patterns of uncertainty’ cannot be reduced to a tangible target for cost reduction. 
Meanwhile, less obviously esoteric sectors—such as ready-made foods, snacks, personal care 
products and other fast-moving consumer goods—exploit the art of branding and marketing 
in ways that  cannot be reduced to costs in a linear manner: ‘getting it right’ involves the 
capacity to sense what is required and act in concert with colossally complicated coordination 
systems (p. 128). Even in China’s ultra-price-sensitive markets, overseas players—such as 
Procter and Gamble, L’Oréal, Unilever and Henkel—occupy robust positions as purveyors of 
fast-moving consumer goods. Clearly, some organisations are able to more than hold their 
own against the Dragons —at least for now. So, what could the Dragons teach us about 
winning in the global game? 
 
 Zeng and Williamson’s fifth and final chapter sets out the responses that are available 
to current leaders seeking to defend their profitability and market share in the face of 
disruptive cost innovation. Hitherto, the influence of Chinese Dragons has entered the world 
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arena through the ‘global gateway’ of manufacturing. But a second wave of attack is surging 
both upstream into R&D and downstream into branding and services (p. 153). While the book 
is clear about the scale of the Chinese challenge, interacting with the Dragons need not 
become a zero-sum game. Zeng and Williamson urge readers to accept the need for a global 
integration, seeking mainstream customers in China, not simply high value minority markets. 
They argue the need to shift high value activities into China to tap intellectual property and 
intellectual capital, and suggest that siting some global activities in China will change 
relationships with local subsidiaries in a way that facilitates better two-way exchange of 
capacities and capabilities. 
 
Dragons at Your Door presents Cisco as one company that is responding effectively to the 
challenge presented by cost innovation. The adverts on prime-time UK TV were a means of 
protecting brand identity in the face of innovative competing products, not simply lower cost 
substitutes. However, Cisco has developed an alliance with Huawei’s principal Chinese rival, 
ZTE Corporation in order to engage in equivalent innovation. Zeng and Williamson propose 
such tactics as options available to counter the threat of cost innovation. They cite the 
establishment of research activities within China by Intel and Microsoft among others and 
suggest that these are not simply directed at market presence or intelligence, but are designed 
to tap local intellectual assets and human capital in order to maximise the gain from their 
inward investment. For Zeng and Williamson, however, the greatest gain would come from 
the integration of Chinese cost innovation sensibilities into their global practice. 
 
Cost Innovation in Context  
 
How typical are the firms described in Dragons at Your Door? Zeng and Williamson describe 
many new high performing start-up, high growth companies. However, these operate against 
a background of parallel routine industrialisation in which more modestly performing 
companies are engaged in learning to serve the domestic market.  
 
Simple cost competition is still in play within China and with her neighbours. Lower value 
manufacturing has moved from China to other countries, most obviously in textiles and 
clothing, but already routine pharmaceutical production is being sourced from Vietnam. 
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These regional movements reinforce the Western view of Asian manufacturing in general and 
China in particular as a source of low-cost support for established activities. 
 
The size of China is both an advantage and a disadvantage. The potential market is a strong 
draw for engagement and investment by the developed economies. However, continuing 
large scale infrastructure development is needed to support both continued growth and the 
diffusion of benefits from the most to least developed regions. The current five year plan 
indicates the recognition of these challenges by the central government 10 .  
 
Zeng and Williamson are operating at the level of the firm and its strategic choice which 
necessarily avoids or by-passes many issues of institutional context. While they acknowledge 
some institutional dimensions, their intention is to reveal the keys to rapid success in global 
markets. In doing so they have identified a new and disruptive mode of entry. 
 
Nevertheless the extent to which firms in China are free to challenge or mimic external 
models varies across sectors. For example the Chinese government retains significant control 
and oversight of transport and communications infrastructure, in keeping with established 
practice for developmental states. Government concerns over the need for a more coherent 
automotive supply chain have led to intervention and enforced consolidation of firms in the 
automotive sector, with similar rationalisation applied to airlines.  
 
Western companies have had to respond to previous disruptive innovations originating in 
East Asia. The cost and quality challenge posed by Japanese companies in the 1970s and 
1980s led to an understanding that Toyota’s lean production model represented a refined and 
re-circulated form of Fordism.  
 
The Ford Motor Company itself was able to leverage its stake in its Japanese partner Mazda 
into a learning opportunity through an AJ (After Japan) programme to identify components of 
the Japanese system that could be integrated with established North American practice11. 
General Motors took advantage of Toyota’s desire to explore the potential of replicating their 
supply chain and system in North America by participating in a joint pilot venture NUMMI at 
Fremont California. This delivered complementary learning for both companies. 
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For Zeng and Williamson the key to dealing with Chinese cost-innovation is comparable 
collaboration including access to the novel Chinese intellectual property and intellectual 
capital which is becoming available as the fruits of government funded research are made 
available for commercial exploitation. 
 
Dragons at Your Door describes this unlocking of the intellectual property and intellectual 
capital in China’s significant scientific and technical infrastructure. This has been achieved 
by the marketisation of organisations and institutes from the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
downwards, resulting in an available active R&D population of around 1 million. 
 
Established Chinese firms have benefitted from these resources. For example, in comparing 
the process of corporatisation of older government firms with the establishment of joint 
ventures, Shen identifies the acquisition by the corporatized and privatised Luoyang 
Telephone Equipment Factory of intellectual property from the Centre for Information 
Technology a research laboratory established by the Peoples’ Liberation Army12. This was a 
key to improving their competitive capacity relative to new joint venture competitors such as 
Shanghai Bell13.  
 
However, the ability to retain and protect intellectual property within China is a concern to 
many potential foreign collaborators. The tradability and robustness of intellectual property is 
a requisite of open innovation14 but problems and concerns over brand dilution through 
counterfeiting and IP leakage deter many from risking inward transfer of propriety 
knowledge.  
 
With WTO accession China has begun the development of appropriate intellectual property 
protection mechanisms. Nevertheless, the transition from legislation to litigation, already in 
evidence with claims pursued between Chinese companies, will inevitably take time. 
Dragons at Your Door points out that in the interim wholly owned foreign enterprises 
(WOFEs) are becoming more attractive than joint ventures since they are regarded as more 
leak-proof. However, in key areas of technology transfer the Chinese government maintains 
pressure for joint ventures. For example the Airbus assembly line opened in partnership with 
the Chinese Industry Consortium in 2008 in the Tianjin Free Trade Zone is a means to 
safeguard access to a domestic market estimated at up to 1900 narrow-body jet airliners. 
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Complementarity of Disruption 
Zeng and Williamson identify areas where the cost innovation model is able to disrupt the 
position of current market leaders. However, as a global player, China is exposed in turn to 
disruptive innovations originating in the developed economies. China has entered the global 
mainstream of high technology manufacture, but still relies upon a relatively undeveloped 
domestic services sector. Recent disruptive innovations originating in the most developed 
economies have been precisely in these areas, with innovating companies such as South West 
Airlines, Ryanair, Amazon and Walmart impacting signficiantly on air transport and retail 
sectors.  
 
It is in the sophisticated service areas that Zeng and Williamson acknowledge difficulties for 
the cost innovation model. Some comparison between India and China will assist 
appreciation of the nature of these difficulties. Both countries are utilising aspects of open 
innovation in their economic development, both are of obvious relevance to the bottom of 
pyramid argument and their combined populations ensure that the consequence of choices 
made in either country will carry global implications.  
 
China’s domestic aviation is more regulated than India’s and has been less able to mimic the 
new loss-cost carrier model. Both China and India lack the quality of infrastructure necessary 
to the new lean service delivery models, but both are exhibiting innovative solutions – for 
example cash on delivery and cycle couriers for Chinese internet retail – which are creating 
the opportunity to develop appropriate business models while the infrastructure catches up. 
 
Appreciation of the role of intangibles in both countries is shown by the acquisitions of a 
variety of established brands. Dragons describes the role of established brands for Pearl River 
piano who acquired the German Rittmueller brand and by Lenovo who have moved away 
from the IBM brand to a $200m contract for brand building with Ogilvy & Mather well 
within the period of use agreed with their former partner.  
 
In consumer packaged goods Procter and Gamble and Unilever have demonstrated that the 
growing middle market segment can be accessed though a strategy of price stratification and 
value added though acknowledgement of Chinese understandings from traditional medicine. 
Such cultural adjustments demonstrate the key to sustainable strategies that re-interpret the 
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niche market as one in which a subset of customers are enrolled in a process of open 
innovation and co-design.  
 
Prahalad argues out that companies who want to invest in bottom of the pyramid markets 
must them part of their core business15. Companies in both China and India are of necessity 
developing strategies to reach the lower levels of the economic pyramid. In India Bharti 
Airtel has created a cell-phone business model adapted to low-value high-volume market 
which delivers significant aggregate value. In China Technova has shown how a market can 
be dramatically expanded from elite to mid-range health care customers by un-bundling 
components, accepting lower margins to create higher volumes through cost advantage and 
attention to the needs of marginal potential customers hitherto disregarded by their western 
competition. Both approaches are of benefit to markets outside the developed countries.  
 
Chinese cost innovation as exemplified by Technova reflects the objectives of open 
innovation and co-design and contributes a potent additional ingredient to the strategy mix. 
Zeng and Williamson rightly emphasise the dangers of a retreat to niche markets by 
threatened firms. However, much movement to higher value in the established production 
networks represents not niche retreat, but value chain movement. This higher value requires 
continuing relationships with customer and suppliers, as with the 'power by the hour' model 
for aerospace engines. This in turn demands a cultural embedddeness which provides an 
additional barrier to newer entrants including Chinese companies. 
 
The key to overcoming this particular barrier lies in the circulation of intellectual capital – the 
key workers. The mobility and availability of highly educated workers is one of the precepts 
of open innovation and a key means of knowledge flow between firms. Saxenian16 suggests 
that Asian engineers working in ‘Silicon Valley’ retained and cultivated links with engineers 
and businesses back home through various social networks and aided development in their 
countries of origin by providing knowledge and market access. Kale et al.17 showed the 
important role of overseas Indian scientists working in the development of R&D capabilities 
in Indian pharmaceutical firms. Both China and India have government policies specifically 
intended to ensure that ‘brain drain’ becomes ‘brain circulation’. 
 
China has benefited from such circulation of human capital since the Indemnity Scholarships, 
set up by the United States in the first decade of the twentieth century with money taken from 
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China as compensation for the Boxer uprising. These skill transfers set a pattern for the return 
of educated individuals which continued after the Communist revolution in 1949. This 
intellectual capital flow contributed to key modernisations and technical developments in 
science and technology in the 1950s and it continues with specific encouragement from the 
present government. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Three key components contribute to the success of the cost innovation strategies described in 
Dragons at Your Door. Firstly the modularised nature of much of modern manufacturing, 
itself an enabler of the development of global production networks set up in pursuit of cost 
savings. This has allowed Chinese companies to experience early exposure to a global system 
and global standards but more systemically integrated products and services present 
problems. Secondly a focus on market volume by Chinese companies prepared to use 
innovation to extend market share rather than increase margins. The volume is used to 
generate the resources to attack higher value niche markets. Thirdly an appreciation of both 
the principles of “open innovation”18 and the contribution of the volume market of the 
“bottom of the pyramid”19 in supporting market entry and development. 
 
Zeng and Williamson offer a valuable inside-out perspective on China’s entry into the global 
economy as a key participant rather than a low cost contributor. They challenge comfortable 
assumptions about the dynamics of the “knowledge economy.” These often mirror the old 
model of the diffusion of material, production from an advanced core to peripheral regions20. 
Dragons at Your Door shows that critical knowledge can be created and applied at all points 
of the economy. Those observers waiting to see the first unequivocally Chinese global brand 
before according China a substantive role in the development of a new socio-technical 
paradigm may miss the point in way in which companies such as Cisco have not. 
 
Zeng and Williamson’s analysis of cost innovation presents a challenge to the advocates of 
open innovation. Can the intense focus of Chinese cost innovators be incorporated into the 
networked approach to the investigation and development of market opportunities? The cost 
innovation model is disruptive not just for established competitors. Has the development 
pathway for other countries been blocked by the growing domination of manufacturing by 
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China and latterly India? China’s awareness of the dangers of a rapid but uneven economic 
growth can be seen in the increasing engagement with the country’s own “bottom of the 
pyramid”. As this develops cost innovation may provide more insights for innovators in both 
developed and less developed economies. 
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